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Jacques Rancière and Hannah Arendt both disavow political philosophy even as they place the 
conflict between philosophy and politics at the centre of their philosophical analyses. In response 
to a roundtable on his „Ten Theses on Politics‟ in 2001, Rancière declared:  
I am not a political philosopher. My interest in political philosophy is not an interest 
in questions of [the] foundation of politics. Investigating political philosophy for me, 
was investigating precisely...what political philosophy looked at and pointed at as the 
problem or obstacle...for a political philosophy, because I got the idea that what [it] 
found in [the] way of foundation might well be politics itself... (Rancière 2003b, para 
10). 
These remarks echo a similar declaration made by Hannah Arendt in an interview with Günter 
Gaus for German television in 1964. Following Gaus‟s introduction of her as a philosopher, 
Arendt protested that she does not belong to the circle of philosophers. If she has a profession 
at all it is political theory: 
The expression „political philosophy‟, which I avoid, is extremely burdened by 
tradition. When I talk about these things...I always mention that there is a vital 
tension between philosophy and politics...There is a kind of enmity against all politics 
in most philosophers...I want to look at politics...with eyes unclouded by philosophy. 
(Arendt 1994, 2) 
Arendt and Rancière followed parallel intellectual trajectories, „turning away‟ from philosophy in 
response to the shock of an historical event and the disillusionment with a former teacher. 
Hannah Arendt attended Martin Heidegger‟s lectures at the University of Marburg in the 1920s, 
which formed the basis of Being and Time. Arendt, a German-Jew who had a brief affair with 
Heidegger while studying at Marburg, was appalled by his support for the Nazi regime as Rector 
of Freiburg University in the early 1930s. In 1946, she wrote bitterly that Heidegger‟s 
„enthusiasm for the Third Reich was matched only by his glaring ignorance of what he was 
talking about‟ (Arendt 1994, 202). She recognized in Heidegger‟s characterization of „das Man‟ 
the philosopher‟s characteristic disdain for public life and, in his support for the Nazis, the 
philosopher‟s tendency to prefer the order of tyranny over the contingency of politics (Arendt 
1994, 432-433). Subsequently, she was preoccupied by the problem of how „such profundity in 
philosophy could coexist with such stupidity or perversity in politics‟ (Canovan 1992, 255). In 
exile from Germany, Arendt undertook the extensive historical research that resulted in The 
Origins of Totalitarianism (1951). Only once she had settled in America did she turn her attention 
directly to political philosophy in The Human Condition (1958).  
2 
 
Rancière constributed to Louis Althusser‟s reading group on Marx‟s Capital at the École Normale 
Supèrieure in Paris in the 1960s. Rancière became disillusioned with Althusser due to his 
opposition to the student protests of May 1968 and his insistence on the privileged role of the 
Party intellectual. In 1972 Rancière wrote: „Althusser needs the opposition between the 
„simplicity‟ of nature and the „complexity‟ of history: if production is the affair of the workers, 
history is too complex for them and must be left to the specialists: the Party and Theory‟ (cited 
in May 2008, 78). In Rancière‟s view, Althusser reproduces a symbolic hierarchy that empties the 
words and actions of political agents (such as the „working class‟) of any intrinsic worth due to 
the division he insists on between manual and intellectual labour (see Deranty 2010, 4). 
Henceforth, Rancière became preoccupied with the problem of the transmission of 
emancipatory experience, seeking to avoid philosophy‟s impulse to either fetishize concepts, on the 
one hand, or to fetishize praxis, on the other (Badiou 2009). Turning away from philosophy, 
Rancière engaged in archival research that resulted in the publication of two anthologies and The 
Nights of Labour (1981). Only later in his career did he begin to write about political philosophy, 
leading to the publication of Disagreement (1995). 
Rancière and Arendt are both praxis theorists who want to escape political philosophy‟s 
reduction of political issues to questions of government. For each of them, Plato seems to stand 
in for their former teacher, exemplifying the philosopher‟s antipathy toward politics. Both look 
beyond the canon of political philosophy to find a more authentic mode of political thought, 
sometimes highlighting apparently marginal figures as exemplary political actors. For instance, 
while Arendt valorises Gotthold Lessing for his passionate openness to the world and love of it, 
Rancière celebrates Joseph Jacotot as the ignorant schoolmaster who presupposes an equality of 
intelligence between teacher and student. Arendt and Rancière both understand politics as 
aesthetic in nature, concerning the sensible world of appearances. They are both preoccupied 
with „events‟ or exceptional moments of political action through which social worlds are 
disclosed to the senses. Given these affinities, sympathetic readers of Arendt might be surprised 
by Rancière‟s claim that Arendt‟s political thought, in fact, represses politics in a way paradigmatic 
of the tradition she sought to escape from. On the contrary, it might appear that rather than 
offering a rival view of politics, Rancière actually amends and extends an Arendtian conception 
of politics (e.g. Ingram 2006; 2008). 
I want to caution against such an interpretation. It is true that Arendt is an important influence 
on Rancière, despite his polemic against her. Yet, as Rancière (2003a, xxviii) observes in a 
different context, „the power of a mode of thinking has to do above all with its capacity to be 
displaced.‟ Arendt‟s understanding of praxis seems to resonate within Rancière‟s work. However, 
those apparently Arendtian notions that Rancière make use of are fundamentally transformed 
when transposed within his broader thematization of dissensus. To develop this argument I first 
examine Arendt‟s own account of the tension between philosophy and politics in order to 
understand the phenomenological basis of the political theory that she sought to develop. I then 
consider how persuasive Rancière‟s characterization of Arendt as an „archipolitical‟ thinker is. In 
the final section, I discuss some key passages in Disagreement in which Rancière alludes to Arendt. 
These passages highlight how those Arendtian concepts that do seem to find their way into 




The meaning of appearances 
 „Every political philosophy‟, Arendt (2005, 27) tells us, „faces the alternative of interpreting 
political experience with categories which owe their origin to the realm of human affairs, or, on 
the contrary, of claiming priority for philosophic experience and judging all politics in its light‟. 
Arendt believed traditional philosophy failed to recognize the specificity of politics because it 
followed the second path, privileging the life of contemplation over that of action. Bikhu Parekh 
(1981, ch.1) highlights four aspects of Arendt‟s critique of traditional political philosophy. First, 
philosophy fails to appreciate the dignity of politics. Rather than recognizing action and 
appearances as intrinsically meaningful, it construes politics as a means to a higher end. Second, 
philosophy fails to appreciate the autonomy of politics. Rather than recognize that political life 
raises distinct ontological and epistemological issues, it treats political problems as matters of 
morality or law. Third, traditional philosophy neglects the fundamental character and structure of 
political experience due to its preoccupation with formal features of political life. Formal analysis 
of concepts makes philosophy inarticulate about political phenomena since it becomes self-
contained and divorced from experience. Fourth, traditional philosophy fails to appreciate action 
as the proper object of political philosophy because it treats politics as a matter of ruling. 
Philosophy‟s preoccupation with questions concerning the legitimacy of government means that 
it fails to appreciate how human beings actualize their freedom by participating in public life. 
Overall, then, traditional philosophy tends to „derive the political side of life from the necessity 
which compels the human animal to live together with others…and it tends to conclude with a 
theory about the conditions that would best suit the needs of the unfortunate human condition 
of plurality and best enable the philosopher, at least, to live undisturbed by it‟ (Arendt 1994, 
429).  
Against this tradition Arendt sought to understand politics on its own terms. In her view, 
philosophy is properly concerned with hermeneutic questions, which originate from existential 
perplexity, the human need to make sense of experience. Such questions cannot be answered on 
the basis of knowledge about facts since they entail judgments of worth. Moreover, answers to 
interpretive questions cannot be judged true or false but only more or less plausible according to 
the insightfulness of the interpretation they offer (Parekh 1981, 61-62). Thus, rather than explain 
political appearances in terms of a deeper truth that they reveal, she sought to understand the 
meaning inherent within appearances themselves. Despite her disillusionment with Heidegger‟s 
own political errors, Arendt appropriates Heidegger‟s concept of world in order to understand 
plurality as the fundamental ontological condition that structures all political experience (Arendt 
1994, 443). 
Arendt‟s insistence on the autonomy of the political as a domain of human experience, distinct 
from the economic, is crucial to her attempt to develop an authentic mode of political thought. 
In order to develop a phenomenology of politics, she must assume that those distinctions we 
make between different kinds of experience (aesthetic, moral, political, economic, etc.) are not 
simply a matter of convention but reflect objective structures that are part of a universal human 
condition (Parekh 1981, 69). To this end, Arendt accords a certain privilege to the political 
thought of the Greeks who, she claims, were more articulate about political experience than the 
moderns (Arendt 1994, 430). For her, concepts should be understood ontologically as 
distillations of experience, a way of assigning meaning and significance to human affairs. Since 
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the political concepts we have inherited originate in the Greek polis, where they were first 
articulated without the burden of tradition, returning to the Greeks allows for the recuperation 
of the fundamental structure of political experience (see Parekh 1981, 72-75). She derives from 
Greek political thought an image of the polity as a space of appearance (Hinchmann & 
Hinchmann 1984, 196f.). She contrasts this image of an authentic politics, oriented to being-in-
common, to the nihilistic, isolating and, indeed, anti-political politics of modernity that made 
possible the Nazi death camps (see Dietz 2000). 
But although the language of the Greeks offers an unparalleled insight into political experience, 
she blames the political philosophies they developed for the displacement and misunderstanding 
of what she takes to be the proper object of political thought: action. In Arendt‟s view, the 
fundamental tension between politics and philosophy arises due to the different nature of the 
experiences of the vita activa (active life) and the vita contemplativa (life of the mind). Since action is 
only possible in the company of others, politics is concerned with „men‟ in their plurality as zoon 
politikon. It is concerned with winning immortality by appearing before others within the polity 
and it entails doxadzein, forming an opinion about how the world appears from one‟s particular 
perspective within it. In contrast, since thinking always takes place in solitude, traditional 
philosophy is concerned with „Man‟ in his singularity as animale rationale. It seeks to discover 
universal truths and it begins from the experience of thaumadzein, speechless wonder at what is 
from the perspective of transcendent reason. According to Arendt, the philosopher is an „expert 
in wondering‟ and „in speechless wonder he puts himself outside the political realm where it is 
precisely speech that makes man a political being‟ (Arendt 2005, 35). 
In describing the emergence of this tension between philosophy and politics, Arendt presents a 
„kind of myth of a philosophical Fall‟, as Margaret Canovan (1992 258) puts it. In the early Greek 
polis, action and thought were united in logos. Arendt describes approvingly how Socrates 
thought that the philosopher‟s role was to help citizens reveal the truthfulness in their own 
opinions (doxa) rather than to educate them with those truths philosophy had already discovered. 
For Socrates, doxa was „neither subjective illusion nor arbitrary distortion, but…that to which 
truth…adhered‟ (Arendt 2005, 19). Doxa was the formulation of dokai moi, „of what appears to 
me‟ (Arendt 2005, 14). Socrates assumed that the world opens up differently to each citizen and 
that the commonness (koinon) of the world resides in the fact that „the same world opens up to 
everyone‟ (Arendt 2005, 14). The achievement of philosophical dialogue was the constitution of 
a common world. In talking about the world that lay between them, the world would become 
more common to those engaged in philosophical dialogue. In this context, to assert ones opinion 
also meant to show oneself, to appear within the world, „to be seen and heard by others‟ and 
hence it was a condition of being recognized by others as „fully human‟ (Arendt 2005, 14).  
Following the trial and death of Socrates, Arendt argues, an „abyss opened up between thought 
and action‟ (Arendt 2005, 6). This event „made Plato despair of polis life‟ and led him to reject 
rhetoric, the political art of persuasion, in favour of the „tyranny of truth‟ (Arendt 2005, 11-12). 
Consequently, Plato elevated the vita contemplativa over the vita activa. In contrast to the eternal 
truths that philosophy sought to discover through reason, the world of politics appeared as 
contingent, arbitrary, meaningless and potentially dangerous to those who sought the truth. 
Against the irresponsible opinions of the Athenians, Plato opposed the Ideas. According to 
Arendt, Plato was the first philosopher to „use the ideas for political purposes, that is, to 
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introduce absolute standards into the realm of human affairs, where, without such transcending 
standards everything remains relative‟ (Arendt 2005, 11).  
Moreover, and following from this, Plato transformed the concept of arkhê into the principle of 
ruling. Arendt points out the Greeks distinguished between two inter-related modes of action 
with the words archein and prattein, which she translates as „beginning‟ and „achieving‟. Together 
these modes of action indicate the contingent and unpredictable quality of a plurality of human 
beings acting in concert. While action requires an agent to seize the initiative, it is dependent on 
others joining this enterprise of their own accord in order to see it through (see Markell 2007). 
Plato, however, sought to master action from beginning to end according to the model of 
fabrication. He did so by dividing the polity between those who know and command and those 
who do and follow orders (Arendt 2005, 52, 91): 
To begin (archein) and to act (prattein) thus [became] two altogether different activities 
[since] the beginner has become a ruler...who „does not have to act at all (prattein), but 
rules (archein) over those who are capable of execution.‟ (Arendt 1958 223, citing The 
Statesman) 
Politics was thereby identified with the issue of how to rule effectively while action was reduced 
to the execution of orders. Since, for Arendt, action is distinguished above all by its initiatory 
quality (or „natality‟), this amounts to the „elimination‟ of action by political philosophy. Plato 
treated politics as a means to establish social order, to protect the philosopher from the whims 
of the demos. In treating politics as a means to secure the private freedom necessary to pursue 
the good life of contemplation, philosophy „deprived political affairs...of all dignity of their own‟ 
(Arendt 2005, 83). The consequence of Plato‟s identification of politics with ruling meant that 
questions of government, legitimacy and authority came to predominate in political philosophy 
in place of understanding and interpreting „action itself‟ (Arendt 1958, 228).  
 
The edge of politics 
Given Arendt‟s anti-Platonism, her disavowal of political philosophy and her desire to 
understand politics in its own terms, what are we to make of Rancière‟s claim that Arendt in fact 
adopts an „archi-political position‟, which represses politics by subordinating it to the logic of 
police (Rancière 2010, 66)? In his essay „Who is the subject of the rights of man?‟, Rancière 
points out that Arendt is able to equate the subject of human rights with a deprived form of life 
because she characterises the political sphere as a realm distinct from that of necessity. Stateless 
people, on Arendt‟s account, are deprived of the possibility of distinguishing themselves as 
human within a public realm (see Schaap 2011; Gündoğdu forthcoming). As such they are 
reduced to their mere biological life within a state of nature, an abject condition beyond 
oppression. According to Rancière, Agamben radicalizes Arendt‟s archi-politics into a stance of de-
politicization (Rancière 2010, 64; see Whyte 2009). Indeed, he claims, Agamben‟s view of the 
camp as the nomos of modernity is: 
..the ultimate consequence of Arendt‟s archi-political position, that is, of the attempt to 
preserve the political from contamination by the private, the social or a-political life. 
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This attempt de-populates the political stage by sweeping aside its always ambiguous 
actors... (Rancière 2010, 66-67 – my emphasis) 
In Disagreement, Rancière explains that archi-politics is one of three paradigms through which 
political philosophy seeks to eliminate politics. According to Rancière, philosophy‟s hostility 
towards politics arises not due to its resentment of the plurality and contingency of opinion but 
its hatred of democracy. Philosophy is scandalized by the lack of any proper foundation for 
political community: the fact that every social order and, hence, every principle of legitimate 
government, ultimately presupposes a radical equality of anyone with everyone. This an-archical 
foundation of politics is viewed by philosophy as a source of disorder and excess to which 
„political philosophy‟ is a response. Consequently, political philosophy attempts to develop „an 
alternative to the unfounded state of politics‟ by achieving the „true essence of politics‟ (Rancière 
1999, 63).  
If Rancière accords any special privilege to the Ancient Greek philosophers it is not because they 
are more articulate than the moderns with regard to the good life of the bios politicos, as Arendt 
(1994, 430) thinks. Rather it is because they were the first to encounter the „secret‟ of politics that 
the political community is „essentially a litigious community‟ (Rancière 2010, 40; Rancière 1999, 
6). Classical political theory encounters the „edge‟ of politics precisely because it does not seek to 
avoid questions of the good life but looks for a good on which the political community should 
be constituted and, in doing so, „bumps into‟ an obstacle: the anarchy of politics, i.e. the „absence 
of any archê meaning any principle leading from the essence of the common to the forms of the 
community‟ (Rancière 2003b, 10, 11). This is expressed in terms of the principle of democracy: 
the qualification according to which the people rule is their „freedom‟ but this is really an absence 
of any specific qualification, which they share with every other citizen. As such, philosophy 
„came upon politics as this oddity that disrupts its logic in advance, meaning, properly, a 
disruption of legitimacy‟ (Rancière 2003b, 12).  
Against the anarchy of politics, political philosophy is founded on the attempt to establish the 
principles according to which the political community is properly organized. The „inaugural 
conceptual act‟ that philosophy makes is the distinction between the good polity (or Republic) 
and the various forms of corrupt government (Rancière 1999, 63). Philosophy suppresses politics 
in seeking to overcome the various bad forms of government (politeiaï) that institutionalize the 
domination of one class over another by replacing them with the good polity (the politeia) in 
which the true purpose of political community is realized. However, the „essence‟ of politics that 
political philosophy proposes to realize is in fact the opposite of political rationality: it is the logic 
of police, which is concerned with establishing a distribution of the sensible in which individuals 
and groups are identified with their position in a social order (Rancière 1999, 63). Rancière 
writes: 
The politieia, as Plato conceives it, is a community achieving its own principle of 
interiority in all manifestations of its life. To put it simply, the politeia of the 
philosophers is the exact identity of politics and the police. (Rancière 1999, 64) 
In identifying politics with the police, political philosophy disciplines conflict, subordinating 
agents to their place within a social order. In identifying police with politics, political philosophy 
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imitates politics, opposing an account of the proper origin and end of political community to the 
anarchic foundation of politics that philosophy first encounters (Rancière 1999, 64-65). 
Archipolitics, which Rancière associates with Plato, is the project of fully realizing political 
community according to the fundamental principle for which it is exists. It is a form of 
communitarian rule that subordinates politics by assigning agents to their proper part within the 
whole. As Luka Arsenjuk (2007) puts it, archipolitics is the attempt to „subsume politics under 
the logic of a strict and closed distribution of parts, a social space which is homogenously 
structured and thus leaves no space for politics to emerge‟. It effectively assimilates the „part that 
has no part‟ by turning it into a sociological category of people: the artisans or labourers who 
contribute to the community through their economic function and, consequently, cannot 
participate in politics simply because they lack the leisure time necessary for politics. Their virtue 
is temperance or moderation, which amounts to „nothing more than their submission to the 
order according to which they are merely what they are and do merely what they do‟ (Rancière 
1999, 67). 
At first blush, this characterization of archi-politics does not sound at all like Arendt. Indeed, we 
can easily imagine several Arendtian objections. Firstly, doesn‟t Arendt precisely aim to 
understand how individuals transcend their social identity (or „what-ness‟) through a struggle for 
recognition in which the actor is distinguished in her singularity (or „who-ness‟) (Arendt 1958, 
211; see Villa 1996, 89f.)? As such, her account of action does not seem at all tied to the social 
order and the assignation of agents to their proper part within it. Secondly, as we have seen, 
Arendt explicitly criticises Plato for identifying arkhê with rule and government, forgetting the 
extent to which arkhê entails beginning (archein) and is dependent on seeing through an enterprise 
with others (prattein). Since Arendt construes arkhê in terms of initiatory action, she takes it to be 
an uncertain, unpredictable and contingent „foundation‟ for politics. Moreover, for Arendt, the 
animating principle of this kind of action is „isonomy‟, which she construes in terms of an 
equality based on a shared freedom from rule. Is it not the case, then, that she valorises precisely 
the kind of politics that an archipolitical perspective is supposed to suppress? (Arendt 1958, 189, 
222; Markell 2006; Balibar 2007). Thirdly, can her account of the polity as a space of appearances 
that emerges from the public interaction of a plurality of agents really be reduced to a 
communitarian image of a homogenous society (Arendt 1958, 198-199; Janover 2011)? For 
Arendt, polity is a fragile and contingent achievement of praxis and its unity is not that of 
sameness (the logic of the social) but rather a manifold expression of the multiple perspectives 
that constitute a public sphere. This image hardly seems to fit Rancière‟s (1999, 65) 
characterization of archipolitics as a project of the complete realization of the community with 
nothing left over, that is, no excess of representation. 
I will return to consider each of these points in the final section of this chapter. Having noted 
them here, however, and given Arendt‟s critique of Plato and her sympathetic appropriation of 
Aristotle, it might seem more plausible to suggest that if Arendt is complicit in the philosophical 
repression of politics this is because she adopts a „parapolitical‟ position, one which domesticates 
politics by re-casting conflict as always in the service of the unity of the polity. Indeed, James 
Ingram (2007, 236) seems to want to correct Rancière when he observes that this is precisely 
how Rancière characterizes Arendt. Whereas archipolitics results in the „total elimination of 
politics‟, Rancière (1999, 70) tells us, parapolitics „refuses to pay this price‟. While Aristotle 
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follows Plato in identifying political action with the police order, he „does so from the point of 
view of the specificity of politics‟ (Rancière 1999, 70). While it would be better to have a city in 
which the virtuous ruled, such a city would not be political for Aristotle since in the polis all 
citizens partake equally in ruling and being ruled. Aristotle takes this political equality as a given 
so that the problem for parapolitics is how to reconcile virtuous government with the equality of 
citizenship. The solution he proposes follows from the recognition that, in order to sustain itself 
in government, a class must seek to rule on behalf of the common good of the whole. In doing 
so, „the party of the rich and the party of the poor will be brought to engage in the same politics‟ 
(Rancière 1999, 74). As Arsenjuk (2007) describes it, parapolitics is „the attempt to reduce 
political antagonism to mere competition, negotiation, exercise of an agonic procedure‟. The 
„part that has no part‟ is incorporated within this order as those whose interests the best must 
claim to serve at all times in order to legitimate their rule. In this way, the community „contains 
the demos without suffering from its conflict‟ (Rancière 1999, 75). 
There are certainly elements of this parapolitical perspective in Arendt‟s work, which Rancière 
also draws our attention to. Indeed, at times Arendt seems to address the parapolitical problem 
of how to combine government by the best with the equality of citizenship. She follows Aristotle 
in recognizing that the artificial equality of the polity distinguishes it from pre-political forms of 
association such as the family or tribe based on natural principles of hierarchy. However, she 
observes, „the political way of life has never been and never will never be the way of life of the 
many‟ even though politics, by definition, always concerns the common good of all citizens 
(Arendt 1990, 275). Her solution to the parapolitical problem is for the public sphere to be both 
open and exclusive (see Villa 1996, ch.1). While in principle the public realm is open to all, in 
practice the bios politicos is the preserve of a self-selected elite who are drawn to politics by a love 
of the world (amor mundi) and „taste for public freedom‟, while those who do not care for politics 
exclude themselves, exercising their right not to participate in government (Arendt 1990, 279; see 
also Arendt 1958, 27-28). Against Arendt, Rancière (2006, 52-53) observes approvingly that 
democratic elections in Ancient Athens were based on the drawing of lots. The role of chance in 
determining who was to rule was seen to be compatible with the principle that „good 
government is the government by those who do not desire to govern‟ (Rancière 2006, 43). 
Moreover, it was a fundamentally political principle because it eroded the „natural‟ entitlement to 
rule based on kinship or wealth: the „title specific to those who have no more title for governing 
than they have for being governed‟ (Rancière 2006, 46). 
Perhaps more significantly, Arendt follows Aristotle in understanding politics in terms of its 
specificity as a way of life (bios politicos) that redeems human existence from the futility of mere 
biological life (zoē). By participating in politics human beings actualize their freedom and invest 
the world with meaning. On this basis she differentiates political action as praxis (involving 
public speech and action that is as an end in itself) from the instrumentality of work as poiēsis 
(involving fabrication or production that is a means to a higher end) and the cyclicality of labour 
(concerned with sustaining life through toil, reproduction and consumption). However, she 
departs from Aristotle in understanding political equality not in terms of partaking in ruling and 
being ruled but the principle of isonomy, which meant both to be free from necessity and „neither 
to rule nor to be ruled‟ (Arendt 1958, 32; Arendt 1990, 30f.; see Balibar 2007). In contrast, 
Rancière insists that the „participation in contraries‟ is the defining feature of a political subject. 
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Indeed, Aristotle‟s understanding of the citizen as one who partakes in ruling and being ruled 
„speaks to us of a being who is at once the agent of an action and the matter upon which that 
action is exercised‟ (Rancière 2010, 29).  
For Arendt, as Rancière (2010, 29) puts it, „the order of praxis is an order of equals who are in 
possession of the power of the archêin, that is the power to begin anew‟. Yet, he insists, Aristotle‟s 
paradoxical formulation cannot be resolved by the classical opposition between poiesis and praxis 
that Arendt revives. As we have seen, Arendt „restores‟ the conceptual link between arkhêin and 
freedom in the principle of natality. Equality is realised through participation in the power of 
arkhê. Rancière argues against this conceptual retrieval, insisting that the logic of arkhê is 
inherently linked to the principle of rule: the meaning of arkhêin was to „walk at the head‟ so that 
others must „necessarily walk behind‟. Hence, the „line between the power of arkhêin (i.e. the 
power to rule), freedom and the polis, is not straight but broken‟ (Rancière 2010, 30). Political 
subjectification, he insists, requires a break with the logic of arkhê (see Rancière 2006, 38-39). 
Arendt can be understood as a parapolitical thinker, then, to the extent that she elides the 
antagonistic moment of politics, which Rancière thematizes as the way police wrongs equality 
(Rancière 2006, 48). Consequently, she „seeks to limit politics, admitting it only in homeopathic 
doses, containing its spontaneity, uncertainty, and contingency by limiting it to certain actors at 
certain times and places‟ (Ingram 2006, 236).  
Yet, since Rancière is a careful reader of Arendt, we should assume that his identification of her 
with Plato, as an archi-political philosopher is to the point and consistent with his broader 
critique. As we have seen, he characterizes Arendt in this way because she wants to preserve the 
political from contamination by the private. The „opposition between the political and the social‟, 
he argues, „is defined entirely within the frame of political philosophy‟ and, hence, „lies at the 
heart of the philosophical repression of politics‟ (Rancière 2010, 42). Rancière‟s critique of 
Arendt was no doubt part of a strategic intervention aimed not only at Arendt herself but the 
uses made of her thought within the particular intellectual milieu in which he was writing. 
Rancière took issue with the notion of a „return of the political‟ and political philosophy in 
France in the 1980s (Rancière 2010, 28, 58; see also Rancière 2006, 23). Invoking the distinction 
between the good life (eu zen) and mere life (zen), some philosophers advocated a recuperation of 
an authentic politics against the encroachments of the social. This gave rise to a wide debate 
within philosophy, sociology, economics and political science over whether historical 
developments had led to a post-political era or had given rise to the possibility of recuperating a 
more authentic politics. As Rancière comments in an interview with Davide Panagia, „the return 
to „political philosophy‟ in the prose of Ferry, Renaut, and other proponents of what is referred 
to, on your side of the Atlantic, as „New French Thought‟ simply identified the political with the 
state, thereby placing the tradition of political philosophy in the service of the platitudes of a 
politics of consensus; this occurring all the while under the rubric of wanting to restore and 
protect the political against the encroachments of the social‟ (Rancière & Panagia 2000, 119).  
In returning to Plato, Rancière (2010, 42) wants to show how the sociological claim about the 
end of politics and the philosophical claim about the return of the political „combine to bring 
about the same forgetting of politics‟. The flipside of Plato‟s archi-political Republic, he argues is 
the invention of a sociological account of democracy against which this ideal community is set. 
Rather than recognizing democracy as one form of government among others, democracy is re-
10 
 
described as a „social phenomena or as the collective effectuation of the properties of a type of 
man‟ (Rancière 2010, 42). According to Rancière (1999, 64), contemporary critics who „contrast 
the good republic with a dubious democracy‟ are heirs to the Platonic opposition between the 
philosophical articulation of the ideal polity and unflattering sociological description of the 
demos (Rancière 2010, 41). This finds its expression in philosophy‟s characteristic „hatred of 
democracy‟, according to which democratic man is represented as unruly and driven by his 
immediate desires (Rancière 2006, 35; Rancière 1999, 22). Indeed, Rancière (2010, 63) insists, 
Arendt‟s „critique of „abstract‟ rights is really a critique of democracy‟.  
This observation is certainly supported by several passages in On Revolution in which Arendt 
disparagingly equates democracy with the rule of majority opinion and representative cliques. But 
while Arendt only makes scattered and passing references to democracy in her work, the critique 
of the social is a consistent theme throughout her work. Arendt deplores what she calls the rise 
of the social in modernity through which the state becomes concerned with the regulation of 
economic life. The cost of elevating life as the ultimate end of political organization is that 
human affairs are deprived of the reality and significance that comes from the world-disclosing 
activity of praxis. „Society is the „public organization of the life process itself…the form [of living 
together] in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes 
public significance‟ (Arendt 1958, 46). Consequently, she says, the public realm has become 
dominated by the concern of „animal laborans‟ to make life easier and longer (Arendt 1958, 208). 
Indeed, Arendt attributes the failure of the French revolution to the fact that it was overwhelmed 
by the insatiable needs of the poor so that aim of the revolution became „abundance‟ rather than 
„freedom‟ (Arendt 1990, 64).  
If Arendt has something in common with Plato, then, it is that her philosophical account of the 
political/republic (as an autonomous mode of being in common through which human beings 
actualize their freedom) necessarily presupposes a sociology of the social/democracy (as a way of 
life that is improper because it makes public what ought to remain private, elevating 
heteronomous needs and interests above the inter-esse of the community). Throughout her work, 
she contrasts her image of polity as a space of appearance to the sociological reality of modern 
democracies in which politics is reduced to collective housekeeping, dominated by the concerns 
of „animal laborans‟ who is driven by his immediate needs and desires. In other words, like Plato, 
Arendt thematizes „the social‟ in sociological terms as a realm of natural determination rather 
than recognizing it as „a disputed object of politics‟, a particular distribution of the sensible that is 
the potential object of politicization (Rancière 2010, 43; Rancière 1999, 91). 
Rancière takes issue with Arendt for presuming that there is a „form of life‟ that is specific to 
politics since this comes to play a normative function within her work. According to Rancière 
(2010, 39), the „notion that politics can be deduced from a specific world of equals of free 
people, as a opposed to a world of lived necessity, takes as its ground precisely the object of its 
litigation‟. In other words, the presupposition of the autonomy of the political, which is 
necessary to sustain a phenomenological ontology, is question-begging. For it takes as an 
ontological given what is, in fact, politically contestable. Arendt makes the mistake of trying to 
derive an account of politics from an understanding of the subject of politics. But this leads to a 
„vicious circle‟ since politics „comes to be seen as a way of life proper to those who are already 
destined for it‟ (Rancière 2010, 28). Indeed, he writes:  
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The canonical distinction between the social and the political is in fact a distinction 
between those who are regarded as capable of taking care of common problems and 
the future, and those who are regarded as being unable to think beyond private and 
immediate concerns. (Rancière 2010, 58). 
Arendtian political thought, on this account, represses politics or becomes a form of „archi-
police‟ in seeking to distinguish in advance what counts as properly political action and what 
amounts to an „anti-political‟ politics, namely the pursuit of particular interests or the satisfaction 
of needs in the public domain. What it seeks to evacuate from the public domain is precisely 
what Rancière takes to be politics itself: a struggle over the distribution of public and private, of 
what is political and what is not, „displacing the limits of the political by re-enacting the equality 
of each and all qua the vanishing condition of the political‟ (Rancière 2010, 54).  
Strikingly, Rancière (2010, 40) does not consider this to be an idiosyncratic feature of Arendt‟s 
work but the vicious circle of political philosophy itself (see also McClure 2003; Rancière 2003b). 
Moreover, the philosophical repression of politics it leads to has real political effects insofar as it 
becomes complicit with a police order. With reference to the French polity, Rancière identifies at 
least three rhetorical effects of Arendtian archi-politics. First, in practice the Arendtian 
purification of the public sphere becomes ideological since it surrenders political issues to 
administration by the state, handing over politics to „governmental oligarchies enlightened by 
their experts‟ (Rancière 2010, 28). Second, it discounts the universalizability of political claims 
about working conditions or the satisfaction of needs. Workers on strike, for instance, can be 
characterized as acting according to their own particular interests rather than considering the 
public good. As such it elides the extent to which their actions in fact invoke a rival conception 
of the common in which their claims could be heard as a properly political (Rancière 2006, 23 
and in this volume). Third, it deprives the subjects of human rights of political agency. The 
subject of human rights becomes a „worldless victim, the ultimate figure of the one excluded 
from the logos, armed only with a voice expressing a monotonous moan, the moan of naked 
suffering, which saturation has made inaudible‟ (Rancière 1999, 126). Consequently, it legitimizes 
humanitarian forms of policing. The rights of the rightless are defended by others: they become 
the right of military intervention (Rancière 2010, 72-75). To be sure, Arendt (1967, 289) is well 
aware of the limits of humanitarian rhetoric, noting that the declarations of an emergent human 
rights movement showed an „uncanny similarity in language and composition to that of societies 
for the prevention of cruelty to animals‟. Rancière‟s claim is not, however, that Arendt herself 
endorses such a form of human rights paternalism but rather that the rhetorical effect of 
Arendtian archi-political discourse is to naturalise the capture of human rights within this kind of 
police logic (see Schaap 2011). 
 
The Displacement of Arendtian political thought 
While couched in distinctive terms, Rancière‟s critique of Arendt is in many respects a familiar 
one. Critics of Arendt have long pointed out that the she does not allow for any mediation of the 
antinomy between necessity and freedom that her political ontology presupposes (Parekh 1979; 
Pitkin 1981; Bernstein 1986). The opposition between the illumination of the public realm and 
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the obscurity of the private realm does not provide any basis for understanding the dynamic by 
which the public sphere is enlarged through democratic struggles or privatized by social power. 
If we accept that politics is fundamentally about politicization, a process of „denaturalizing‟ 
oppressive social relations to reveal them as the contingent effect of social organization, then we 
are likely to agree with Rancière that Arendt is complicit in the philosophical repression of 
politics. 
While acknowledging this to be a problematic aspect of her thought, however, many sympathetic 
readers of Arendt nonetheless see important conceptual resources in her work for thematizing 
an agonistic politics that would be quite close to that advocated by Rancière. In her book, Political 
Theory and the Displacement of Politics, for instance, Bonnie Honig recognizes that Arendt can be 
interpreted either as a „virtue‟ theorist (who displaces politics) or as a „virtù theorist‟ (who 
valorises agonistic politics). It is therefore possible to recuperate Arendt for a radically 
democratic politics because her „politics beckons beyond itself to practices of disruption, 
augmentation and re-founding that surpass the ones she theorizes and circumscribes‟ (Honig 
2003, 204). In terms of Honig‟s distinction, one might say that Rancière‟s critical reading of 
Arendt as a virtue theorist, is part of an interpretive strategy intended to develop his own 
thematization of politics form a virtù perspective. But in doing so, he neglects the virtù aspects 
of Arendt‟s thought, which we might instead choose to emphasize. 
Consequently, sympathetic readers of Arendt (myself included) have been tempted to see in 
Rancière a way beyond some of the impasses that afflict an Arendtian account of politics (Schaap 
2010). James Ingram (2006, 236), for instance, suggests that Rancière does not arrive at a radically 
opposed account of politics to Arendt, but radicalizes Arendt, amending rather than rejecting her 
account of politics. While Rancière agrees with Arendt that politics is participation as a an equal 
in public affairs, he takes a step back from Arendt‟s starting point to view politics as the „struggle 
to achieve that status‟. While Ingram does not seek a synthesis between the two accounts of 
politics, he suggests they are complimentary: by understanding politics a s „struggle to participate 
in public in public life‟ Rancière „gives Arendtian politics a point and at the same time 
universalizes it: the point of political action is inclusion and equality‟ (Ingram 2007, 239). If the 
main difference between them is that Arendt conceives politics as a sphere while Rancière views 
politics as a process, Ingram explains, this difference arises due to their different philosophical 
backgrounds in phenomenology and Marxism.  
Rancière‟s contemporary relevance is no doubt due, in part, to his contribution to a vein of 
political theory that Jean-Philippe Deranty (2003) characterizes as „ontology of the political‟. This 
includes Arendt, but also other Heideggerian thinkers such as Nancy, Agamben and Lefort. 
Rancière‟s engagement with this phenomenological tradition is always polemical and, as Deranty 
points out, produces a radical and original position. In this final section, however, I want to 
suggest that the difference of perspective between Arendt and Rancière that Ingram brilliantly 
analyses may be more of an obstacle to an accommodation of their respective accounts of 
politics than he acknowledges. If Rancière does end up using some Arendtian concepts, these are 




To show this I want to return to the three Arendtian objections that I have already briefly 
outlined. First, her conception of human agency in terms of the disclosure of the „who‟ through a 
struggle for distinction provides a basis for understanding how actors are able to enact a subject 
position that is not socially determined. Second, her thematization of arkhê in terms of beginning 
places politics on precisely the kind of an-archic foundation that Rancière thematizes as the 
equality of anyone with everyone. Third, her understanding of the political in terms of the 
disclosure of a common world from a plurality of perspectives is only another way of 
understanding that excess of representation that separates the „we‟ invoked in political discourse 
from a sociologically determined entity. In each case, an Arendtian might suspect, Rancière has 
actually (albeit, perhaps unintentionally) taken a concept from Arendt and twisted it to suit his 
purpose. 
Let‟s start with the third objection and work backward. In Disagreement, Rancière mentions 
Arendt only once (and then in a half-approving reference to her thesis of the „banality of evil‟, 
which does not concern us here). However, throughout the text there are numerous allusions to 
Arendtian concepts. For instance, Rancière‟s thematization of dissensus as „putting two worlds 
into one‟ seems to borrow the idea of „world‟ so central to Arendt‟s phenomenology (see 
Rancière 1999, 55-56). Moreover the term „dissensus‟ itself alludes to the notion of the „sensus 
communis‟, which Arendt associates with the notion of world disclosure (see Dikeç 
forthcoming). In both cases, what is important is the aesthetic aspect of politics in the disclosure 
of the common. 
However, in his thematization of dissensus, Rancière resolutely breaks with the idea of the 
autonomy of the political, which we have seen is fundamental to Arendt‟s ontology and, indeed, 
to phenomenological approaches more generally. He insists that there is no such thing as an 
essence of the political and he rejects Arendt‟s understanding of the political in terms of a shared 
life world (Rancière 1999, 61). In a key passage in which he refers to Nancy but might as well be 
talking about Arendt, he writes:  
Political impropriety is not not belonging: it is belonging twice over: belonging to the 
world of properties and parts and belonging to the improper community...Politics...is 
not the community of some kind of being-between, of an interesse that would impose 
its originarity on it, the originarity of being-in-common based on the esse (being) of 
the inter (between) or the inter proper to the esse...The inter of the inter esse is that of 
an interruption or an interval. The political community is a community of 
interruptions, fractures, irregular and local, through which egalitarian logic comes and 
divides the police community from itself...Political being together is a being-between: 
between identities, between worlds...A political community is not the realization of a 
common essence or the essence of the common. It is the sharing of what is not given 
as being in-common... (Rancière 1999, 137-138) 
As we have seen, Arendt turns to Heidegger‟s concept of world to develop her mode of political 
thinking, which takes plurality as the ontological condition for action. As Deranty (2003) 
discusses, Rancière twists this notion of world into an ontology that is also an anti-ontology. The 
putting of two worlds into one means bringing together community and non-community, being 
and not-being, equality and its absence (Rancière 1999, 55-56). Or, in another formulation, it is 
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„the community based on the conflict over the very existence of something in common between 
those who have a part and those who have none‟ (Rancière 1999, 35). 
Following Heidegger, it has now become commonplace to associate politics with the „ontic‟ 
while „the political‟ refers to the „ontological‟ (Marchart 2007, 11f.). If politics refers to struggle 
over the distribution of the benefits and burdens of political association, the political refers to 
the background horizon in relation to which politics appears. In Arendt‟s terms, the political is 
the disclosure of a common world from the agonistic inter-play of plural perspectives brought to 
bear upon it. In contrast to this twofold distinction, Rancière (2010, 53) refers to a „disjunctive 
relation between three terms‟ (my emphasis), according to which the political is the meeting point 
of the two heterogenous processes of politics and police. Politics refers to the process of 
emancipation based on the verification of an equality of anyone with anyone. Police, in contrast, 
is a process of government and the parcelling out of roles and identities within a social order. 
The political is the field for the encounter of these two process (or „two modes of human being 
together‟) in which a wrong is staged or demonstrated: it is the putting of two worlds into one, 
the community invoked by the part that has no part into the community that is defined by the 
distribution of the sensible in which politics intervenes (Rancière 1999, 27; Rancière 1992, 58).  
As such, the political, as Rancière (1999, 139) conceives it, has the same quality of an event of 
disclosure as Arendt accords it. In fact, one might hazard that he provides a way to overcome the 
impasse between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom that afflicts Arendtian 
accounts of politics. Indeed, one might read the police here as just another word for what Arendt 
conceives as „the social‟. However, it is important to recognize that for Rancière, police and 
politics are not different in kind. They are not separate spheres, as the social and the political are 
for Arendt (Rancière 2010, 70). For Rancière police is not „real‟ as in the sociology of Arendt‟s 
archipolitics but, rather, a symbolic order, a partition of the perceptible. What politics does is 
insert a rival image of the common within the existing social order, another partition of the 
perceptible, to produce a „contentious commonality‟ (Rancière 1999, 9). So the concept of world, 
as Rancière describes it here, loses the quasi-normative status that it acquires in Arendt‟s 
account, which allows her to describes some people as being deprived of world and others to be 
more „worldly‟ (see Janover forthcoming). 
Consider next Rancière‟s understanding of the an-archic foundation of the political community. 
Arendt seeks to reclaim the concept of arkhê from the tradition of political philosophy. She re-
thematizes arkhê as beginning (rather than ruling) and restores its relation to prattein, as following 
through. Moreover, she understands equality as a pre-condition for action and she characterizes 
this equality as isonomy, which she takes to mean precisely the absence of rule. According to 
Balibar (2007) this principle of isonomy is fundamentally an-archic. As such, the origin of 
community is to be found in the freedom of a plurality of agents acting in concert. It is the 
dramatic enactment of this freedom that is the ultimate ground of political institutions, which is 
re-enacted in moments of civil disobedience. Indeed, certain descriptions she offers of the public 
sphere seem to indicate its subaltern or insurgent quality: constituent moments in which the 
people appear on the political scene (e.g. Arendt 1958, 198-199). On this account, as Ingram 
(2006) puts it, the common is not homogenous or unified but defined by difference and conflict 
while promising moments of commonality. 
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If Rancière seems to follow Arendt in recognizing the anarchical foundation of the polity in a 
radical equality, he departs from her in thematizing equality in abolitionist terms. In other words, 
in his view, the meaning of equality can only be determined through the negation of inequality 
(Deranty & Renault 2009). Equality is a presupposition of an entitlement to participate in 
politics, which is always enacted in a situation of inequality: 
Nothing is political in itself for the political only happens by means of a principle 
that does not belong to it: equality. The “status” of this principle needs to be 
specified. Equality is not a given that politics presses into service…it is a mere 
assumption that needs to be discerned within the practices implementing it. 
(Rancière 1999, 33) 
This explains why Rancière (2010, 30) takes issue with Arendt‟s identification of equality with a 
shared participation in the power of arkhê‟, insisting, against her, that arkhê always also entails 
commanding. For, in thematizing the anarchic foundation of the polity in terms of the „wrong‟ of 
the social order, Rancière insists on recognizing the antagonistic dimension of constituent 
moments that Arendtian agonism elides (Deranty & Renault 2009; Frank 2010, ch. 2; 
Christodoulidis & Schaap forthcoming). Contrary to Arendt‟s (1958, 180) claim that politics is 
only possible where people are neither simply for nor against but only „with‟ each other, for 
Rancière the world-disclosing quality of action is revealed precisely in moments of antagonism 
(cf. Badiou 2005, 21f.). On this account, class struggle is not the „hidden truth behind 
appearances‟ but „politics itself‟, i.e. „politics such as it is always encountered, always in place 
already, by whoever tires to found the community on its arkhê‟‟ (Rancière 1999, 18). 
Finally, what about Arendt‟s understanding of the way in which the agent distinguishes herself 
through action? For Arendt, it is through the struggle for recognition, the striving for distinction 
in a public sphere, that individual actors reveal who they uniquely and unexchangably are. 
Arendt‟s thematization of this process of singularization is attractive to theorists of agonistic 
politics since it suggests a way to understand how agents are able to transcend oppressive social 
identities, how action brings about a „re-opening of the terms of our social inter-action‟ (Ingram 
2007, 244). For Arendt the „what‟ of human existence is part of what we share with nature, those 
properties of identity and otherness. The „who‟ corresponds to natality: it is that ineffable quality 
of selfhood that transcends the natural world (Arendt 1958, 179). The disclosure of the 
singularity of the agent is the existential achievement of action. „This appearance, as distinguished 
from mere bodily existence, rests on initiative, but it is an initiative from which no human being 
can refrain and still be human‟ (Arendt 1958, 176). In relation to the natural world of causal 
determination, the disclosure of the singularity of the agent has a miraculous quality.  
Rancière‟s notion of subjectification might thus seem to build upon Arendt‟s account of 
singularization. Indeed, he alludes to Arendt as he develops the concept in Disagreement. As in 
Arendt, the subject of politics does not precede politics but is constituted through action. This 
disclosure of the agent in the act is the creative aspect of politics. But, Rancière writes: 
A mode of subjectification does not create subjects ex nihilo; it creates them by 
transforming identities defined in the natural order of the allocation of functions and 
places into instances of experience of a dispute. „Workers‟ or „women‟ are identities 
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that apparently hold no mystery. But political subjectification forces them out of 
such obviousness by questioning the relationship between a who and a what in the 
apparent redundancy of the positing of an existence. (Rancière 1999, 36) 
The above passage suggests that, Rancière differentiates his notion of subjectification directly in 
contrast to Arendt‟s account of singularization. Subjectification begins through an act of 
negation or dis-identification and the claiming of an impossible identity within a given context. 
Rather than understanding agency only in terms of the disclosure of a radically indeterminate 
subjectivity that is irreducible to the identity ascribed to her, the underlying social conditions that 
determine the embodied experience or „what‟ of an agent are taken to be a condition of 
possibility for her effective agency (see McNay 2010). As such, subjectivization does not simply 
entail the transcendence of oppressive social identities or „mere bodily existence‟ but their 
transformation. If Rancière shares Arendt‟s concern with appearances, what he attends to are the 
ways in which these are regulated, the processes of representation that thwart or co-opt the 
appearance of subjects in the public realm. As such subjectivization is always tied up with the 
struggle to make visible the wrong of the social order (Rancière 1999, 39). 
 
Arendt and Rancière both want to avoid philosophy‟s characteristic repression of politics, which 
arises because philosophy treats politics as a problem of government. Rather than a philosophy 
of right, therefore, they each turn to aesthetics to understand the conditions of possibility for 
action and appearance. Working within the tradition of phenomenology, Arendt relies on an 
ontology that differentiates action into separate domains of experience, each associated with a 
fundamental aspect of the human condition: life, worldliness and action. The phenomenology of 
politics she develops on the basis of this founding presupposition of her theory is evocative and 
her concern with political appearances resonates within Rancière‟s own thematization of politics. 
Despite Rancière‟s anti-phenomenological stance, it can seen that through his critical 
engagement with this Arendt, Nancy and others, he has inherited some phenomenological 
concepts.  
If Rancière does end up using some Arendtian concepts, however, he unmoors them from her 
ontology, which he resolutely rejects. Politics for him is not a way of life that we are in danger of 
forgetting. There is nothing essential about politics that philosophy has repressed. And the 
political is not an autonomous domain of experience that philosophy has misinterpreted in terms 
of categories derived from other experiences. Rather, for Rancière, politics is a certain rationality 
based on the assumption of equality that every social order depends on but seeks to conceal. 
Philosophy is overtly scandalized by that fact that the legitimacy of every social order ultimately 
depends on this anarchical foundation. And the political is the name given to the appearance of 
class struggle, which reveals the possibility of social transformation. Consequently, for Rancière 
(1999, xii) a mode of thinking that would capture the specificity of politics would not start from 
speechless wonder at human plurality, as Arendt suggests, but rather would take the aporia of 
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